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1WHITE PAPER April 9, 2020
Rendezvous Based
Pandemic Tracing
by sharing Diffie-Hellman generated common secrets
Summary
There is an urgent need to shorten the period of the current economic slowdown,
caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 pandemic.
In order to prevent new outbreaks, it is essential to trace potential carriers of the
virus. For this purpose, mobile technologies provide the most prominent solution,
since mobile devices are typically present, where viruses are transmitted in human-
human encounters.
In this white paper we propose a method that keeps users persistently unidentified.
Consequently, there is no kind of a registration (no mobile number or other persistent
identifier), that could introduce privacy issues
Instead of having focus on people, the proposal has a focus on individual en-
counters, rendezvouses; hence the name 'Rendezvous Based Tracing’.
Being authority-less, this proposal will address some obvious drawbacks of distrib-
uted solutions proposed this far, providing data for spatiotemporal analytics of viral
transmission, while not making any compromises on actual alerting.
However, it is essential that a single solution becomes adopted within regions where
people commute or travel. The presented approach shares common elements with
Identity Based methods. Therefore, the authors will continue their work by examining
possibilities for integration, especially with PEPP-PT.
Authors
Ville Ollikainen, M.Sc., Senior Scientist in Applied Cryptography research team / VTT
Kimmo Halunen, Ph.D., Applied Cryptography research team leader / VTT
2Foreword
There is an urgent need to shorten the period of the current economic slowdown,
caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 pandemic.
In order to prevent new outbreaks, it is essential to trace potential carriers of the
virus. For this purpose, mobile technologies provide the most prominent solution,
since mobile devices are typically present, where viruses are transmitted in human-
human encounters.
In this white paper, the authors will present a method for Rendezvous Based Tracing,
addressing some major drawbacks of distributed solutions proposed this far. VTT is
interested in co-operating with all partners, regardless of the chosen approach,
providing its multidisciplinary expertise at the disposal of common good.
Reference: Identity Based Solutions
Western democracies have adopted values of protecting individual privacy. There-
fore, distributed approaches for virus (and people) tracing are strongly preferred over
centralized methods. While there are quite a few ongoing projects globally, there are
two mobile solutions that have been presented in the Finnish media above others:
A. TraceTogether1, a Singaporean solution that reportedly saved the densely
populated country from a major outbreak.
B. PEPP-PT2, a European privacy-by-design initiative with essentially similar
functionality.
These (and probably several others in the making or less publicly deployed) solutions
are carefully designed, not to disclose sensitive user information without user con-
sent. They are however based on identifiable users; therefore, we will refer to these
by a general term of ‘Identity Based Solutions’.
In these solutions, contacts are detected by short-range radio communication
means, especially Bluetooth. Other party’s identifier is recorded into user’s mobile
phone in an encrypted format, typically using public-key encryption. If users are di-
agnosed as carriers, they can upload their contact lists to a database operated by
an authority (such as Ministry of Health in Singapore) capable of decrypting it. The
authority will then act upon the information they get.
In order to Identity Based Solutions to work, the authority gets to know, who the
individual contacts were, narrowing the amount of information that can be recorded
regarding any particular rendezvous. For instance, recording location and providing
it to the authorities, would disclose the location of the other party as well, since the
other party’s identity is known. Consequentially, the presented Identity Based Solu-
tions do not record location. Role of location is of specific importance, and it is dis-
cussed later in this document.
Limitations of Identity Based Solutions
In the light of how the SARS-CoV-2 has spread in the past, Identity Based Solutions
fail to address two critical phenomena:
1 https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg Accessed in April 7, 2020
2 https://www.pepp-pt.org Accessed in April 7, 2020
31. Role of events, based on time and location, in spreading the virus. It is no-
table how events, such as sports events, religious gatherings and even fam-
ily celebrations have rendered into Petri dishes of viral congestion. Since
Identity Based Solutions do not record location (for the privacy reasons),
events can be found only indirectly after interviewing individual people and
analysing the interview data separately. In other words, Identity Based So-
lutions provide only limited support to real-time situation awareness.
2. Nihilistic and ignorant behaviour. There is a visible minority which considers
being either outside or on top of the epidemic. Despite of all alerts, this mi-
nority keeps on visiting ski resorts, going to discos and museums if possible,
and meeting other people; behaving normally for the moment, not being con-
cerned about the pandemic. Before getting sick, that is. Because the pan-
demic is initially not respected, we can assume them to be
a. most effective group in transmitting the virus and
b. least interested to download and install any APP and to be regis-
tered or recorded by any means.
Proposal: Rendezvous Based Tracing
In order to properly address the two presented concerns - in addition to uncompro-
mised virus tracing - we propose a method that keeps users persistently unidentified.
Consequently, there is no kind of a registration (no mobile number or other persistent
identifier), that could introduce privacy issues.
Instead of having focus on people, the proposal has a focus on individual en-
counters, rendezvouses; hence the name 'Rendezvous Based Tracing’.
The proposed solution has an APP to be installed to a mobile phone. Without regis-
tration, a user can install and launch the APP privately, without awareness of nearby
people or any authority. This property aims at making the APP acceptable, conse-
quently rising APP penetration, especially among the most challenging minority
groups.
The process is illustrated in Figure 1 and described step-by-step in the following text.
Figure 1. Process in Rendezvous Based Tracing.
4A: Discovery
As in the state-of-art, Bluetooth is used to detect proximity between two users, while
other data, such as estimated distance can also be extracted.
B: Creating common secret
When two users are in proximity, mobile phones calculate a common secret using
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. The result of this key exchange is
hashed with a cryptographic hash function together with the exchanged Bluetooth
messages:
RID = H( DH || exchanged Bluetooth messages ),
where DH is the result of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, RID a unique Rendez-
vous IDentifier, a common secret identifying the particular encounter, not the parties
involved. It is essential to note, that the RID is a secret that both parties share, and
no one else knows.
If the two people would meet again, new random values would be in place, making
the RID different for each such encounter.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a widely used algorithm to generate a shared se-
cret. It has a paramount advantage, that an eavesdropper cannot compute the
outcome. Consequentially, the eavesdropper will remain unaware what the RID
was.
Because of Diffie-Hellman, parties can also negotiate and share other information,
such as, where the RID will be published if either party turns out to be in a period
of contagiousness at the particular time of the encounter (cf. load balancing, dis-
cussed later).
C: Recording the RID
It has been learned from previous epidemics, that longer exposure time increases
likelihood of infection. Therefore, Figure 1 illustrates an optional delay before the RID
is memorized: if the other party will not still be present after a few minutes, the RID
can be discarded.
Otherwise, the RID will be recorded into a RID list in the mobile phone.
Obviously, RIDs don’t have to be saved forever: When an incubation period is over,
old RIDs can be deleted from the mobile phone. Therefore, it is also essential to
store time information with each RID.
There are reasons to store time information with a certain coarse granularity, such
as one day accuracy. This will be discussed later, with an illustrative example.
In addition to the RID, some metadata, such as location information or duration of
the encounter, can be recorded as metadata. This information will be useful, if the
metadata is donated for further analysis. It should be noted, that there are reasons
to use asymmetric encryption for the metadata, also discussed later with the same
example.
D: Positive diagnosis (of User B)
When a user is diagnosed positive, he/she (User B in Figure 1) receives anonymous
a one-time disposable key, which enable
· uploading the RID list to alert others, and also
· donating possible metadata for further analysis.
5It is irrelevant for the proposed method, how the upload keys are delivered, but at
simplest they could be QR codes printed on paper and stored in closed envelopes
in a vault at health care facilities providing test results. If the location has no upload
keys at hand, keys could be delivered with secure electronic means, such as telefax
if nothing else; a person skilled in the art may develop more sophisticated electronic
methods.
When User B gets the key, he is allowed to upload his RID List to a Publishing
Server: only the RID List is uploaded, no timestamps, no metadata.
Since each RID in the mobile phone list has a timestamp associated, it is advanta-
geous to upload only the RIDs that have been generated during his congestion
period.
The Publishing Server will add the uploaded RIDs to its data repository, into a ‘Purple
List’. The Purple List consists of RIDs of potentially contagious encounters; it
is publicly available, completely anonymous data.
It is advantageous to add information to each RID, whether the uploading party has
actually been diagnosed positive (‘first-tier’ alerting), or has only been in contact
with an alerted suspect yet waiting for diagnosis (‘second-tier’ alerting). Tier class
(1 or 2) should be published with RIDs, as the only associated information.
As mentioned, each RID is a secret between the parties in an encounter: it is only
the other party of an encounter, which knows the origin of the RID. Therefore, RID
lists are safe to be published.
Final stages E: Continuous use and F: Alerting others
After a user has installed the APP, it begins to poll the Publishing Server, requesting
updates of the Purple List.
If the same RID exists both in the Purple List and in the local memory of the
phone, the APP immediately alerts the user for a possible infection.
If the alert was first-tier, i.e. originating from a positively diagnosed user, the alerted
user (User A in the Figure, before any diagnosis for her) will be encouraged to dis-
close their RIDs for second-tier alerting. In the case of first-tier alert, the user is ad-
vantageously instructed to quickly go to nearest testing facilities, perhaps with a fast-
lane ticket provided by the APP.
If the alert was second-tier, also other instructions, such as self-quarantine or social
distancing could be given, depending on how much time has lapsed from local RID
timestamp, when it is compared to typical incubation period.
A note on load balancing:
Obviously, if the epidemic becomes widespread, there are quite a few RIDs in the
Purple List. As a simple approach it would be engineering-as-usual to create load
balancing for the Publishing Server, there is also an opportunity to have a farm of
publishing servers: as mentioned before, parties can also share other information
after the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Additional information after DH could be
sharing, into which server in the farm they would upload their RIDs, each server
having their individual Purple Lists. By doing this, the APPs may only request Pur-
ple List updates from the servers that exist in their history.
6Supporting situation awareness
As mentioned above, there may be metadata recorded when creating a RID. It is fair
to assume that without becoming identified, a user is likely to disclose more:
Metadata may be donated as a separate entity (i.e. without RIDs) to authorities that
are maintaining situation awareness of the epidemic. The metadata enables creation
of heatmaps, visualizing spatiotemporal hotspots for further investigation.
Some sources have mentioned that as high as 60% penetration may be needed
before any app becomes effective enough for greater good. Spatiotemporal analysis
will reduce the required penetration significantly, since swift detection of emerged
hotspots enable authorities to request visitor lists, ticket sales information etc. of the
event that has taken place at the particular time and location.
It should be underlined, that location is most sensitive data; there are numerous
ways to combine location data with external sources to compromise the privacy of
the users. Under no circumstances will metadata be published. As voluntarily
donated, it should stay confidential.
Further notes on recording locations:
1) Google is actively tracking locations on Android phones by default. Users
can switch off location tracking: If it is turned off, naturally it will not be rec-
orded by the alerting system, either. Therefore, it is up to the user, which
APPs has access to location information.
2) As long as the location belongs to a public sphere, there is only little risk of
misuse. Of course, some locations may be sensitive by nature, but in that
case, the user is likely to switch off location tracking completely. IF he/she
is not aware of that option, it can be made visible in the APP.
3) However, if the location is in the private sphere of either party, there may
be a policy not to record it at all. This would be engineering-as-usual: de-
tecting places where people spend majority of their time may be used to
disable recording location on both sides.
Further notes on recording timestamps:
1) For alerting, recording a timestamp on one-day granularity is enough, since
incubation and contagious periods vary a lot. This would have a positive
impact on privacy (see the next comment box).
2) For situation-awareness, on the other hand, timestamp must be accurate
for precise spatiotemporal analysis. This means, that metadata timestamps
should be recorded separately from RID timestamps.
It would be advantageous, it after Diffie-Hellman key exchange both parties would
agree on a common timestamp and location information to be recorded as metadata.
If either party denies recording, metadata would be discarded on both sides. If ac-
cepted, authorities would eventually get consistent information from both parties,
making it easier to match this voluntary information.
Metadata will not be published, but it would be available for authorities creating real-
time situation-awareness. If the users want to leave their contact information for au-
thorities, that is obviously possible, but not mandatory.
7Further notes on protecting metadata (with Carl and Bob example):
It is advantageous to encrypt all recorded metadata asymmetrically with a public
key provided by the situation awareness authority. Why? Let’s take an example:
Carl and Bob have met and they have created a RID. Suppose that the timestamp
and location would be available on the mobile, and it turns out that Bob has been
in contagious period. Unfortunately, Carl got infected from Bob and unintentionally
passed on the disease in a family reunion, causing fatalities. If at that point the
timestamp of the RID is exact, or the metadata would be available for Carl, he could
reason from time/location that Bob should be held responsible for his loss. Conse-
quences would be unpredictable.
This is why RID timestamps should have fairly coarse granularity and metadata
should be appropriately encrypted in a way that only the situation awareness au-
thority can decrypt.
Comparison to Covid Watch3
A list of other decentralized approached is available at gdprhub.eu website4. Of all
the published approaches there, only Covid Watch by Stanford University is essen-
tially similar to the proposal.
As a main difference to Covid Watch, each device in Covid Watch creates a random
number on regular intervals, broadcasted and shared with others in the proximity.
Both transmitted and received numbers are recorded. In contrast, the proposed
method uses shared secrets created in Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Otherwise, the alerting process is essentially the same, and benefits are very similar.
Covid Watch may scale better to densely populated areas, since individual commu-
nication between two mobiles is not necessary. However, it has two disadvantages
compared to the proposed method:
1) Since the numbers are changing frequently, duration of an encounter cannot
be measured. This information is valuable when it is uploaded to the Situa-
tion Awareness analytics, since we know that longer exposure increases
likelihood of infection; longer durations make some hotspots even hotter
than hotspots with casual passing-by.
2) Broadcasted numbers in Covid Watch are not secrets. Consequentially, they
can be eavesdropped and recorded by a third party, possibly associated with
data that discloses identities, such as surveillance camera footage, or credit
card number at a point-of-sales. Even only from the network traffic one could
use some analysis techniques to check which numbers have changed at the
given refresh intervals and use this information for tracking individuals.
When the server discloses numbers related to an infection, the eaves-
dropped data may possibly disclose the identity of the infected person. In
short, Covid Watch cannot be considered completely safe.
However, as a whole, the authors find Covid Watch most interesting.
3 https://www.covid-watch.org Accessed in April 9, 2020
4 https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Projects_using_personal_data_to_com-
bat_SARS-CoV-2#Pan-European:_Decentralized_Privacy-Preserving_Proxim-
ity_Tracing_.28DP-3T.29   Accessed on April 7, 2020 at 14:00 CET
8Benefits of the proposed approach
§ Click-and-Use: no registration needed.
§ With metadata, outburst can be swiftly located, in place and time.
o Lower APP penetration required
§ Users are in control
o Easily explainable privacy
o With privacy understood, users are likely to disclose more.
§ The method is simple and straightforward, easy to explain and implement.
Discussion
The authors wish that this whitepaper would have a positive contribution to develop-
ing user-acceptable virus tracing. Any APP taken into use must cover as large pop-
ulation as possible, especially those who normally are least willing to participate.
It is fair to say that when users
§ do not have to register themselves and
§ have a justified feeling that no-one is able to trace them personally,
it improves acceptance of the APP.
Developers should specifically consider people with negative stance to preventing
COVID-19. In the proposed approach, the selling point is obvious: as long as nothing
happens, the users give out absolutely nothing (not even registration), only may re-
ceive something (even lifesaving).
It is essential that a single solution becomes adopted within regions where people
commute or travel. The presented approach shares common elements with Identity
Based methods. Therefore, the authors will continue their work by examining possi-
bilities for integration, especially with PEPP-PT.
Whatever the tracing solution will be, it must always be a good servant, never a bad
master.
9Authors
Ville Ollikainen
Mr. Ville Ollikainen received his M.Sc. degree in Technical Physics in 1989 from
Helsinki University of Technology with an academic minor and 2.5-year employment
in the laboratory of Industrial Psychology, covering studies in computer assisted
training and organization development. He worked previously at Technical R&D of
MTV Finland. Mr. Ollikainen has been working at VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland as a senior scientist. In this role, he has since 1999 contiguously participated
in projects related to new media technologies, excluding a period of entrepreneur-
ship: he was one of the main inventors behind Envault Corporation Oy, a data secu-
rity company he was establishing in 2007. He has contributed to over 30 patent ap-
plications. His current activities include privacy preserving recommendation sys-
tems, privacy-by-design targeted advertising and social networking services, most
recently coordinating a European Union's Horizon 2020 funded project HELIOS
(grant #825585), developing a novel peer-to-peer platform for privacy-enabled social
media. Since 2019, Mr. Ollikainen has been working at VTT’s cybersecurity re-
search.
Kimmo Halunen
D. Sc. (Tech.) Kimmo Halunen, Research Team Leader at the VTT Technical Re-
search Centre of Finland in Oulu and Adjunct Professor at the University of Oulu. He
has obtained his D. Sc. (Tech.) in computer engineering on hash function security in
2012 and has over 20 publications related to security, cryptography and blockchain
technology in refereed conferences and journals. In the course of his research he
has contributed to several national and international projects as a researcher and as
an expert of information security and cryptography in a commercialization project in
authentication. He leads a project on measuring the security of cryptographic primi-
tives in the Finnish Defence Forces research program. He has been leading cyber-
security growth initiatives at VTT from 2014 onwards. During 2014-2015 he visited
the COSIC group in KU Leuven in Belgium for 9 months. He also acts as a cyberse-
curity advisor for Streamr.
For more information please contact
Ville Ollikainen
Tel. +358 400 841116
ville.ollikainen@vtt.fi
Kimmo Halunen
Tel. +358 40 6751836
kimmo.halunen@vtt.fi
About VTT
VTT is one of the leading research and technology organisations in Europe. Our
research and innovation services give our partners, both private and public, all over
the world a competitive edge. We pave the way for the future by developing new
smart technologies, profitable solutions and innovation services.
We create technology for business – for the benefit of society.
  www.vttresearch.com
